The role of country-specific fundamentals in sovereign CDS spreads: Eastern European experiences  by Kocsis, Zalan & Monostori, Zoltan
Emerging Markets Review 27 (2016) 140–168
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Emerging Markets Review
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/emr
The role of country-speciﬁc fundamentals
in sovereign CDS spreads: Eastern
European experiences✩
Zalan Kocsis*, Zoltan Monostori
Magyar Nemzeti Bank 1054 Szabadsag ter 8-9, Budapest, Hungary 1054 Szabadsag ter 8-9, Budapest, Hungary
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 2 April 2015
Received in revised form 12 May 2016
Accepted 13 May 2016
Available online 21 May 2016
JEL classiﬁcation:
C3
E44
E60
G12
H63
Keywords:
Sovereign CDS spreads
Country-speciﬁc fundamentals
Dynamic hierarchical factor model
Eastern Europe
A B S T R A C T
We investigate the determinants of sovereign CDS spreads on a sam-
ple of Eastern European data. A dynamic hierarchical factor model is
used to aggregate information in indicators of economic fundamen-
tals. CDS spreads are regressed on forecasts of factors. We ﬁnd that
domestic fundamentals explain more of CDS spread variance than
global factors, largely due to their ability to explain differences in
sovereign risk across countries. The effects on CDS spreads are found
to be time-varying. In terms of economic signiﬁcance, the factor of
institutional-political strength stands out. We apply the model to
study CDS spreads of Poland, Russia and Turkey.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
✩ We are indebted to Peter Benczur, Zoltan Reppa, Andras Fulop, Robert Lieli, Viola Monostorine Grolmusz, Daniel Horvath,
MicheleModugno, Heber Farnsworth, Zsolt Kuti and two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions.We are grateful
for Viola Monostorine Grolmusz and Anna Delikat for their help with the data. The views expressed in the paper are those of the
authors and do not represent the oﬃcial stance of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (The Central Bank of Hungary).
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: kocsisz@mnb.hu (Z. Kocsis), zoltan.monostori@uni-corvinus.hu (Z. Monostori).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2016.05.003
1566-0141 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
/
Z. Kocsis, Z. Monostori / Emerging Markets Review 27 (2016) 140–168 141
1. Introduction
Sovereign credit spreads and their determinants have been an intensively studied topic in the
macro-ﬁnance literature, in part because of the subject’s importance for policymaking. Sovereign credit
spreads signiﬁcantly affect the cost of public debt, and therefore it is crucial to understand which factors
govern these spreads. Research may thus be useful in pointing out which key variables shape spreads,
and accordingly, which fundamental variables policymakers should focus on.
This study assesses the empirical relationship between sovereign CDS spreads (our proxy for
sovereign risk) and a wide array of fundamental variables of thirteen Eastern European countries
in the sample period between December 2008 and December 2014. Fundamental variables fall into
the ﬁve categories of real growth; external position; ﬁscal position; banking sector vulnerability; and
political-institutional strength.
We address two main issues. On one hand, we intend to contribute to the ongoing discussion in
the literature that assesses the relative importance of global and country-speciﬁc factors in explaining
sovereign spreads. On the other hand, we seek to differentiate between the latter, domestic fundamental
factors and investigate the role each plays in CDS spreads.
Our key innovation compared to the existing literature on sovereign credit risk is the use of a dynamic
hierarchical factor model, which aggregates the information in our wide set of noisy fundamental vari-
ables. To extract factors, we use the ‘bottom-up’ hierarchical modelling approach developed in the recent
factor analysis literature (Diebold et al., 2008; Moench et al., 2013). The model assumes that country fun-
damental factors are determined partly by top-level factors common to the Eastern European region (this
makes the model hierarchical) and partly by components particular to the given country. We regress CDS
spreads on the 1-year ahead forecasts of these fundamental factors instead of directly using fundamental
variables in regressions, which is the mainstream approach. To deal with missing data, we apply a mod-
iﬁed version of the EM estimation method proposed by Ban´bura and Modugno (2014). Our addition in
this respect is adapting themethod to a third, country, dimension (besides the time-variable dimensions)
and using the iterative steps required for separate estimations of the hierarchical levels of the model.
We argue that our technique helps circumvent several problems that necessarily arise in the analysis
of the relationship between sovereign credit spreads and fundamental determinants:
• The inclusion of the plethora of determinants that could theoretically inﬂuence sovereign spreads
may cause dimensionality and collinearity problems in regressions, whereas their limited inclu-
sion may lead to omission bias. Factor models offer a solution by reducing the data set dimensions,
while aiming to retain much of the data set information. We consider this a better approach than
the common way to proceed, which instead selects a few key variables representing the most
important fundamentals. The latter approach is somewhat arbitrary, moreover selected individual
variables will contain less explained variance of the full data set than the same number of extracted
(orthogonal) factors. An alternative approach that avoids the arbitrariness of variable selection is
the use of Bayesian model averaging (Maltritz and Molchanov, 2014).
• The factor method also offers a treatment of various data-related problems, such as errors-in-
variables, mixed data frequencies, and varying publication lags and sample lengths of available time
series. These problems are especially relevant for data of emerging market country fundamentals.
One particular beneﬁt of using a factor model in this regard is that it allows for the inclusion of
a number of variables related to the vulnerability of the banking sector. As reviewed in the next
section, a large and growing literature identiﬁes banking sector risk as theoretically and empiri-
cally relevant for sovereign risk. However, empirical studies on emerging market sovereigns, to our
knowledge, have not used explicit proxies for this fundamental category so far, probably due to the
mentioned data issues.
• Regressions using contemporary fundamental variables may be problematic on two accounts. On
one hand, most macroeconomic variables are reported with a publication lag and are thus not
available at the time of CDS spread quotes. On the other hand, it is the expectation of future
fundamentals and not contemporary fundamentals that should affect CDS spreads, because CDS
spreads price the future probability of sovereign default and are therefore forward-looking in
nature. The methodology in this paper provides a consistent way to handle both publication lags
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and expectations of variables. The 1-year ahead forecasts of fundamental factors take into account
the information set available exactly at the given point in time, which includes only data already
published. Survey forecasts are naturally integrated into this framework as data with negative pub-
lication lags, i.e. data that are available up to the end of the 1-year forecast horizon. Survey forecasts
thus act as noisy observations of future values of fundamental factors.
• Country fundamentals are in part determined by global factors (e.g. Russian GDP growth rate expec-
tations are partly due to the global economic outlook), however, it is the country-speciﬁc part of
variables that local policymaking may hope to have an impact on. A simple method to control for
the common time series ﬂuctuations in variables is a period ﬁxed effects framework. Unfortunately,
the reaction to common shocks is not homogeneous across countries (empirical evidence shows
that countrieswith higher credit spreads are affected signiﬁcantlymore by global shocks than coun-
tries with lower spreads), and so removing the cross-section means by period ﬁxed effects does
not remove the correlation with the common factor (see Giannone and Lenza, 2010, for similar
argumentation regarding the relationship of savings and investments). A hierarchical factor model
seems to be a suitable device to separate the common and country-speciﬁc parts of fundamen-
tals. An alternative and valid approach is that of D’Agostino and Ehrmann (2014), which separately
estimates yield regressions of fundamentals for the risky and risk-free sovereign.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to use a dynamic hierarchical factor model within the
sovereign credit risk literature. Nonetheless, such models have been applied already in other areas of
economics and ﬁnance. Regarding economic applications, several papers investigates international busi-
ness cycle linkages via hierarchical factor models (e.g. Del Negro and Otrok, 2008; Francis et al., 2012;
Kose et al., 2003). Moench et al. (2013) study US real activity variables in a four-level hierarchical model,
whereas Stock andWatson (2008) apply a country, regional, state decomposition to US building permits.
In ﬁnance, Diebold et al. (2008) extend the Nelson–Siegel yield curve factor estimation to amulti-country
context using global and country-speciﬁc factors, while Bae and Kim (2011) also add regional factors.
In an application to equity returns Ando and Bai (2014) use a hierarchical factor model to characterize
Chinese A- and B-shares.
Closer to our area, in the corporate credit risk ﬁeld, Schwaab et al. (2016) use a dynamic hierar-
chical factor model, where ﬁrm value is determined in part by global, regional macroeconomic factors.
The authors also aim to synchronize macroeconomic variables with credit risk by including them with
leads/lags, which is technically different, but conceptually similar to what we do. The main difference
with respect to our model is that we extract fundamental components for each country and fundamen-
tal category separately, whereas in Schwaab et al. (2016) the regional level is the lowest macroeconomic
level in the hierarchy. On the other hand, their model is richer due to the inclusion of global, regional and
industry frailty factors.
Our paper joins the already vast and growing literature on sovereign credit risk determinants. We
do not attempt to give a general review of the ﬁeld, but rather refer the readers to Augustin (2014)
and Kraussl et al. (2016) for two recent, involved enumerations of related studies. However there are
a few smaller areas in this literature of particular interest to us (the use of forward-looking indicators;
estimation of time-varying fundamental effects on spreads; inclusion of bank, political, institutional fun-
damentals; and studies related speciﬁcally to Eastern Europe), so that we devote the next section to a
literature overview of these.
We contribute to the sovereign credit risk literature by re-addressing the main questions of this
subject area using the mentioned methodological approach. We investigate the roles of global and
country-speciﬁc fundamentals in explaining sovereign CDS spreads. Also including fundamentals rep-
resenting banking sector vulnerability and the institutional-political background, we assess the relative
importance of various country-speciﬁc determinants. We check whether fundamental effects were
relatively stable over time.
We also add to the empirical literature by examining the country-speciﬁc CDS spreads of Poland, Rus-
sia and Turkey. On one hand, this section aims to demonstrate the practical use of the outlined method
and, on the other hand, it seeks to offer speciﬁc explanations for the levels of and changes in the three
countries’ sovereign CDS spreads.
Z. Kocsis, Z. Monostori / Emerging Markets Review 27 (2016) 140–168 143
The paper has the following structure. After the literature review in the next section, Section 3 intro-
duces the data set and themethodology for the factormodel and the regressions of CDS spreads. Section 4
presents general regression results and their discussion and documents the evolution of factor effects on
CDS spreads. Section 5 turns to analysing the relative CDS spreads of the three largest countries in the
region. The last section outlines the main conclusions and suggests some ideas for future research.
2. Recent literature
This section reviews four developments of the recent sovereign credit risk literature, which we
consider important and related to our analysis.
2.1. Use of forward-looking fundamentals
As argued above a key advantage of the dynamic factor method is that it provides a natural method
to extract forward-looking fundamentals: where available, it consistently incorporates survey forecasts
where available, otherwise it produces forecasts based on themodel dynamics. Though this methodology
is novel, a multitude of studies have recognized the need to use forward-looking fundamentals before
us. In the past decade it has become increasingly common to include consensus expectations from sur-
veys instead of published data (e.g. Csontó, 2014; D’Agostino and Ehrmann, 2014, Nickel et al., 2011,
Zoli and Sgherri, 2009, just to cite a few). However in most applications there are survey expectation
proxies only for a subset of fundamentals, which would still necessitate forecasting of the remaining
factors.
There are other options for including forward-looking fundamental information. One approach is to
use credit ratings (DeSantis, 2014; González-Rozada and Yeyati, 2008), as ratings aim to assess future
default risk and so are forward-looking by nature. Ratings however cannot substitute all information in
fundamentals as showed already by Cantor and Packer (1996). An alternative possibility is to use ﬁnancial
indicators, which are also forward-looking, such as bank CDS spreads or domestic equity indices. Bank
CDS spreads may indeed be an appropriate proxy for ﬁnancial sector health, though these are only avail-
able for larger banks, which excludes this possibility for most emerging markets. An option may be the
use of bank equity indices as done by Gatarek and Wojtowicz (2015) in the case of Poland. Our approach
is to instead use explicit proxies of banking sector fundamentals and extract factor forecasts of these.
A caveat regarding equity indices and credit ratings is that these are aggregatemeasures and thus pre-
vent the analysis of individual fundamental effects. The use of forward-looking subindexes such as ICRG
political risk indicators (e.g. Bekaert et al., 2014; Comelli, 2012; Kennedy and Palerm, 2014) or EIU risk
measures used by Alper et al. (2013) and also in the current papermay provide a solution. Another poten-
tial problem though is that both ratings and equity indices may be determined by a different weighting
of various fundamental components than sovereign credit spread measures. Still another, interesting
possibility entertained by Clark and Kassimatis (2015) is to apply a structural credit risk framework to
sovereigns and estimate a measure of country economic value analogously to ﬁrm value in the corpo-
rate literature. Clark and Kassimatis (2015) show that their country economic value measures contain
relevant forward-looking information about sovereign spreads.
2.2. Time-varying effects of fundamentals
Although the topic is certainly not new, there has been an increasing attention in the literature
directed towards the time-variation of effects of both local fundamentals and external drivers of sovereign
risk. Most studies look at how effects have changed between crisis and non-crisis or high and low
volatility states of the world. A variety of methodologies are employed. The simplest method, and
also the one we use in the current paper, is to estimate the model on subsamples, manually select-
ing break dates (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; Comelli, 2012; González-Rozada and Yeyati, 2008;
Heinz and Sun, 2014). A more reﬁned method is to use threshold regressions or regime switching mod-
els (Banerjee et al., 2016; Csontó, 2014; Delatte, 2014; Jaramillo and Weber, 2013), when the regimes
or regression states are determined endogenously. A possible approach (Dumicˇic´ and Rizdak, 2011) is
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to use interaction terms between fundamentals and volatility index. Still others assume either a para-
metric (D’Agostino and Ehrmann, 2014) or semi-parametric (Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012) model for
time-varying coeﬃcients. Piljak (2013) and Piljak and Swinkels (2015) investigate shifts in correlations
in GARCH-DCC frameworks.
There is consensus that effects of sovereign credit risk determinants vary over time, but other results
are much varied across different studies. Csontó (2014) ﬁnds that in high volatility states the sensi-
tivity to global factors increases. Baldacci et al. (2008); Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) and Jaramillo and
Weber (2013) report an increase in the effect of domestic ﬁscal variables and several fundamental effects
increase on the sample considered by Dumicˇic´ and Rizdak (2011). Piljak (2013) ﬁnds that domestic
inﬂation and monetary policy are important in explaining time variation.
We follow a couple of articles in this line of research (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Eichengreen
and Mody, 1998), which use their estimates of time-variation in parameters to assess what fraction of
sovereign spread changes could be attributed to changes in the fundamentals and another component
due to a shift in the pricing of fundamentals. The latter component is also termed fundamentals-based
contagion (e.g. Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2016). A related concept is the wake-up call effect or
wake-up call contagion (Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Dasgupta et al., 2011; Giordano et al., 2013), which
refers to the case when the shift in fundamental pricing occurs as a result of similarity of a country to a
crisis country.
2.3. Fundamentals related to banking system vulnerability, politics and institutions
The theoretical rationale and empirical evidence of effects of real economic growth, the ﬁscal
position (ﬁscal balance, debt ratio) and the external position (central bank reserves, current account
balance, terms of trade) is fairly straightforward and was established already before the 90s (two
seminal papers were Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Edwards, 1983). Most studies in the sovereign risk
literature control for these country fundamentals, though the proxies actually included are quite
varied.
We also include in our analysis two other categories of country-speciﬁc fundamentals, banking sector
vulnerability on one hand and political-institutional strength on the other. The ﬁnancial crisis and the
subsequent sovereign crisis in the eurozone highlighted the interlinkages between systemic banking risk
and sovereign risk and gave an impetus to research on the bank-sovereign nexus. Studies documented
that Eurozone sovereign spreads increased in correspondence with the increase in banking sector sys-
temic risk, with announcements of bailouts in the banking sector and the market began to differentiate
between European sovereign along this dimension (see for instance Attinasi et al., 2009; Banerjee et al.,
2016; Ejsing and Lemke, 2011; Zoli and Sgherri, 2009). Therefore banking sector vulnerability was found
to have a time-varying and signiﬁcant effect in explaining European sovereign spreads.
However the phenomenon is not new and not constrained to post-crisis Europe. Banking crises his-
torically often preceded sovereign defaults (Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Two
channels could be at work: that of bailouts resulting in credit risk transfer from banks to sovereigns and
bank crises leading to recessions and hence deteriorating ﬁscal positions. On the other hand the increase
of sovereign credit risk feeds back into bank vulnerability through the sovereign bond portfolio in bank
balance sheets as argued by Acharya et al. (2014) and others. Gennaioli et al. (2014) claim that the latter
channel presses sovereigns to try to avoid default when banks in the country have larger bondholdings,
which results in lower sovereign spreads. Kallestrup et al. (2016) investigates bank balance sheets in
more detail, identiﬁes cross-border ﬁnancial — sovereign exposures and shows that sovereign CDS are
affected by local bank foreign exposures.
Lastly, the strength of market-friendly institutions and political stability are also crucial determi-
nants of sovereign credit risk as default is often a political decision.1 The willingness to service debt is
more likely in countries with strong democratic, market-friendly institutions which are integrated into
the world economy and in countries with less volatile political systems and stable governments. The
1 Sovereign default could also occur when there is insuﬃcient ﬁnancing liquidity and the government does not have access to
market or international oﬃcial resources to roll over debt. In this case, the government willingness to repay is immaterial.
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related literature is not as new (Cole and Kehoe, 1998; Erb et al., 1996), but there have been some impor-
tant recent additions (e.g. Baldacci et al., 2008; Bekaert et al., 2014; Eichler, 2014) and such variables
are perhaps more routinely incorporated in emerging market sovereign risk assessments than before
(Comelli, 2012; Csonto and Ivaschenko, 2013; Kennedy and Palerm, 2014).
2.4. Recent literature on Eastern Europe
The ﬁnal set of studies we brieﬂy review are those restricted to analysis of the Eastern European
region. Effects of fundamentals may be heterogeneous across regions, and thus estimates on other cross-
section samples such as Eurozone countries or a wider group of emerging markets may be less relevant
for this region. The empirical sovereign risk literature on Eastern Europe is a relatively small subset of
emerging market studies. It is still large enough that we do not attempt to give a complete review here,
we rather aim to cover the papers most relevant to our analysis, published after the onset of the ﬁnancial
crisis.
Most papers ﬁnd that Eastern European sovereign spreads are sensitive to global risk pricing, but
ﬁndings about fundamental determinants are mixed. Alexopoulou et al. (2010) estimate a pooled mean
group model on Central Eastern European countries for the 2001–2008 period and report signiﬁcance for
a number of usual macro variables, with ﬁscal variables being more important in countries with worse
fundamentals. žigman and Cota (2011) contributes by demonstrating the signiﬁcance of the domestic-
foreign composition of public debt. Nickel et al. (2011) only ﬁnds Hungary and Russia sensitive to
developments in ﬁscal position in individual country regressions, although their ﬁscal proxy is signiﬁ-
cant when country data are pooled. Ebner (2009) similarly emphasizes the cross-country heterogeneity
of fundamental effects and contrasts this with a uniform sensitivity to an external volatility indicator
pointing to a larger importance of developments external to local fundamentals.
Several papers on the region highlight the time-varying nature of effects. Heinz and Sun (2014)
estimate dynamic panel regressions for the period 2007–2012 including growth, ﬁscal position and
current account survey forecasts as proxies for local fundamentals. In their sample augmented with
eurozone periphery countries they ﬁnd a smaller role for the external position and a larger one for ﬁs-
cal and growth proxies. They also note that both the growth outlook and the ﬁscal position became
more important since the crisis. Bobetko et al. (2013) also ﬁnds that both the effect of ﬁscal fundamen-
tals and the reaction to global risk aversion increased after 2007 in emerging Europe, while Dumicˇic´
and Rizdak (2011) additionally reports that external balances have become more important in the
crisis.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data set
We have a panel data set of thirteen Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine) with the sam-
ple useful for extracting factors beginning in December 2008 and ending in December 2014. The sample
was determined by data availability.
We use the logarithm of 5-year CDS spreads to proxy sovereign credit risk. CDS spreads have several
advantages compared to bond spreads over the risk free rate, the main alternative measure of sovereign
risk. Several studies showed that CDS spreads tend to lead bond spreads in price discovery (for example
Alper et al., 2013, Gyntelberg et al., 2013). CDS spreads are also available for ﬁxed maturities and taking
credit risk positions via CDS necessitates less funding liquidity.
We follow the existing empirical literature in the choice of explanatory fundamental variables, but
also include explicit proxies taking into account banking sector vulnerability. In particular, variables
originate from (and are categorised into) the ﬁve variable groups:
• real economic activity (growth rates of GDP, consumption, industrial production, investments);
• the country’s external position (various measures of trade balances, external debt, current account
and reserves);
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• the ﬁscal position (ﬁscal deﬁcit and several types of debt ratio variables);
• banking sector vulnerability (indicators from the IMF Financial Stability Indicators including
banking sector income, capital, liquidity and portfolio quality variables); and
• institutional strength — political stability (various indicators by the Heritage Foundation).
Where available, we use Consensus Economics survey projections of variables instead of actual pub-
lished data.2 On the one hand, surveys are forward-looking in nature like sovereign CDS spreads. On the
other hand, the practical advantage of using surveys is that important variables, such as the GDP growth
rate, the current account balance or the ﬁscal balance, whose actual data are usually available on a quar-
terly basis (and are published with signiﬁcant time lag) do not need to be interpolated: they are available
on the survey’s usually higher publishing frequency. The Consensus Economics surveys are published on
a monthly frequency.
There are two more variables relating to country fundamentals, initial (end-2009) GDP per capita and
sovereign credit ratings, which are used in some of the model speciﬁcations. Regarding sovereign credit
ratings, we apply the usual linear transformation of the credit ratings of the three major rating agencies
(Fitch, Moody’s, S&P) and use the average of the three series. Using the average has the advantage of
increasing the frequency of observed rating changes.
Several variables of global importance are also enlisted in our data set. There are two US fundamental
variables (GDP growth and current account forecasts) and three global fundamental variables (principal
components extracted from EIU risk indices for a large cross-section of developed and emerging market
countries). Our data set also includes ﬁve ﬁnancial variables of global importance including the VIX index
and oil prices to proxy global risk, liquidity and commodity price developments.
Appendix Table A1 provides more information on the variables included in the analysis.
3.2. Factor model of explanatory variables
Our application requires a methodology that can handle several data related problems:
a. the dimensionality problem posed by the large set of explanatory variables,
b. possible measurement error in variables,
c. the necessity to use forward-looking measures for all variables (not only those for which survey
forecasts are available),
d. differences in publication lags of variables,
e. differences in sample length (different start dates and end dates),
f. mixed frequency (annual, quarterly and monthly) of the data set.
Further, we need a method that explicitly separates country-speciﬁc and global components of
fundamentals for later use in CDS regressions.
The dynamic factor model and estimation strategy laid out in Ban´bura and Modugno (2014) can deal
with all of the above listed data problems. To estimate the model for a set of countries, however, we
need to modify their factor model and the algorithm to accommodate our two hierarchical layers. Hier-
archical factor models assume that observed variables are determined in part by low-level factors, which
themselves are determined by factors at a higher level. In our setting, low-level factors are the coun-
try fundamental factors that aggregate information of variable groups in each country separately. The
top-level factors are, on the other hand, factors of region-wide effect that are common determinants of
country fundamental factors.
There are two distinct approaches for hierarchical modelling in the current literature. The top-down
approach (e.g. Ando and Bai, 2014; Kose et al., 2003) ﬁrst extracts the top-level factors of the hierarchy
2 Consensus Economics publishes end-year projections. We construct one-year ahead (ﬁxed horizon) forecasts by interpolating
between the forecasts for the actual and following year as common in the literature that use similar data (D’Agostino and Ehrmann,
2014; Dovern et al., 2012; Nickel et al., 2011).
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from the full data set and then extracts lower level factors from the residuals of variables unexplained
by the top-level factor. The bottom-up approach (Diebold e t al., 2008; Moench et al., 2013) instead ﬁrst
extracts lower level factors from groups of variables and then extracts higher level factors from the lower
level factors. We choose the latter, bottom-up approach.
More formally, we assume that fundamental variables ym,t for country m = 1, . . . ,M and time period
t = 1, . . . , T are determined by a single country fundamental factor, Fm,t, representing the variable group
of the country, and an idiosyncratic component, em,t. The country fundamental factors thus represent the
comovement of variables of a given country within variable groups described before: real growth (FREAL),
external position (FEXTERN), ﬁscal variables (FFISCAL), banking sector health (FBANK) and political stability
and institutional strength (FINST). The variable-speciﬁc component, on the other hand, relates to idiosyn-
cratic features of the variable itself, possibly measurement errors, that distinguish it from other variables
in the same group and same country. The country fundamental factor, Fm,t, is assumed to be further sep-
arable into a common Eastern European fundamental component, Gt (e.g. GREAL represents the common
real growth outlook for the whole region), and a country-speciﬁc fundamental component, fm,t, that is
the unique feature of the fundamentals of the country compared to other countries in the region (e.g.
fREAL,Russia would be the Russian country-speciﬁc real growth outlook), as well as a country-factor effect,
lFm. The following equations represent this model:
ym,t = lym + K
yFFm,t + em,t + n
y
m,t , n
y
m,t ∼ N(0,Ry),
Fm,t = lFm + K
FGGt + fm,t + nFm,t , n
F
m,t ∼ N(0,RF),
em,t = Aeem,t−1 + gem,t , g
e
m,t ∼ N(0,Qe),
fm,t = Af fm,t−1 + g
f
m,t , g
f
m,t ∼ N(0,Qf ),
Gt = AGGt−1 + gGt , g
G
t ∼ N(0,QG), (1)
The ﬁxed parameter loading matrices KyF and KFG specify the sensitivity of variables to country fac-
tors and country factors to top-level common factors, respectively. In our application these matrices are
assumed to have a block zero structure. Each variable is assumed to load on exactly one of the factors,
the factor that represents its variable group. Similarly each country factor is assumed to load on a single
top-level regional factor. Further, loadings of KyF are assumed to be the same for each country. For iden-
tiﬁcation reasons key variables are restricted to have unit loading in KyF and the ﬁrst country in the list
(Bulgaria) is restricted to have unit loading in KFG.
The factors Gt, fm,t and em,t are allowed an AR(1) structure in the model, but the A
G, Af and Ae matri-
ces controlling their autoregressive structure are restricted so that cross-correlation between factors
are zero. The AR(1) dynamics can be generalised to less restrictive AR(p) dynamics if lags of factors are
included in the Gt, fm,t and em,t vectors, though we assume an AR(1) structure in this paper. Further we
restrict AR(1) parameters to be less than 1.001 to avoid explosive dynamics.
Similar to Ban´bura and Modugno (2014) we setup the model with technical error terms, nym,t , n
F
m,t ,
which are assumed to be Gaussian with variance ﬁxed to j, a very small number. The innovations of
factors, gem,t , g
f
m,t , and g
G
t , are all assumed to be independent Gaussian terms with estimated diagonal
variance matrices Qe, Qf, and QG.
The framework aggregates the information of a larger number of variables into a smaller num-
ber of factors, which is useful to handle both the dimension and measurement error problems (points
a) and b) above). The dynamic model of factors explicitly estimates factor persistence, which in turn
makes it straightforward to estimate forecasts of factors, the forward-looking measures of fundamentals
(point c).
The last three points (d through f) of the above list as well as the hierarchical structure complicates
the estimation of the model. The panel data set of the observed explanatory variables are unbalanced
due to these points, and therefore standard maximum likelihood estimation of the factor model is not
possible. The EM algorithm originally proposed by Dempster et al. (1977) and applied by Ban´bura and
Modugno (2014) for the dynamic factor model with arbitrary patterns of missing data handles these data
problems. The EM algorithm iterates between two steps: the E step evaluates the expected likelihood
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of the data given estimated parameters and observed data by running the Kalman ﬁlter. The M step of
the iteration estimates parameters by maximising the expected likelihood given the smoothed factor
moments recovered in the E step.
Compared with Ban´bura and Modugno (2014) we use a panel data structure, which adds the two-
level hierarchy to the setup proposed by the authors. This necessitates adding a new step to the iteration.
Expanding terms, we can write the measurement equation as:
ym,t = lym + K
yF(lFm + K
FGGt + fm,t) + em,t + n
y
m,t (2)
Note that if the common regional factor, Gt, and parameters were known, then the terms relating
to the global components and ﬁxed effects could be subtracted from fundamental variables, yielding
transformed variables of the form, y˜m,t = ym,t − lym − KyFlFm − KyFKFGGt . The transformed variable
and latent factors fm,t and em,t could then be written in a linear Gaussian state space form, which
could then be estimated by the modiﬁed EM algorithm described in more detail in Appendix B. On the
other hand, if the country factors, Fm,t, were known, Gt could be consistently estimated by principal
components.
Our estimation strategy thus involves running the EM algorithm on the dynamic factor model of the
transformed variables in the ﬁrst step and extracting the top-level factor in the second step. The two
steps are repeated until the expected likelihood evaluated in the E step converges.
Once the parameters of the model are estimated, we use these parameter estimates to recover fore-
casts of fundamental factors at the forecast horizon h, fˆm,t+h|t and Gˆt+h|t based on the information set of
each time point, t. To do so, we run the Kalman ﬁlter forward on the transformed y˜m,t variable, from the
beginning of the data sample up to the end of the forecast horizon t + h. Note that for some variables
the data is available up to the end of the 1-year ahead horizon (surveys), while for other series the time
series ends at or before the start of the forecast horizon. This is accounted for in the ﬁltering procedure
the same way as treating missing data: for each time point only the data available at the time are treated
as observed. Obtaining the sequence of fm,t by the ﬁlter, we update Fm,t and obtain Gt by principal com-
ponents. Taking factors to be observed at this point, parameters lFm, K
FG, as well as AG result from OLS
estimation. The factor forecast fˆm,t+h|t together with the country ﬁxed effect, lFm, constitute the country-
speciﬁc part of fundamentals,whereas KFGGˆt+h|t constitutes the common regional part. These are saved
for later use in regressions.
As we step through the time sample we obtain a time series of the forecasts of fundamental factors
beginning in December 2008 (referring to the December 2009 state of country fundamentals) and ending
in December 2014 (referring to the December 2015 state of country fundamentals). These factor time
series are then used in regressions of CDS spreads for the same sample period between December 2008
and December 2014.
3.3. Interpretation of factors
Appendix Table A2 displays correlations between the underlying fundamental data and their respec-
tive country factors, Fm,t. In general it could be said that most of the fundamental variables have
signiﬁcant correlations with their fundamental factors. This points to strong correlations of variables
within each fundamental group on which the factor method can capitalize. The table also demonstrates
that factors do summarize data of most variables within the group and do not only load on one or a few
speciﬁc fundamentals.
Comparing factors, we see that the factor representing the real growth outlook displays the highest
overall correlations. Based on squares of correlation coeﬃcients, the factor explains more than 80% of
variation in the data. Although correlations seem signiﬁcant in case of most variables, the average of
explained variance is much lower for other fundamentals. It is in the 40–55% range for the external and
ﬁscal position, and institutional-political strength, while it is 23% for the banking sector variable group.
Part of the explanation is simply that there are more variables in these groups, but also the variables
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are less correlated with each other as they are conceptually more different. The high variable-speciﬁc
component in these groups also raises the possibility of larger measurement errors.
The factors, at least in the latter four variable groups, load on some variables more and less on others,
which should shape their interpretation. The real growth factor has the highest loading on GDP growth,
so can be interpreted as the variable (note that since it is the key variable of the group the scale of the
factor is also set to GDP growth). The external position factor loads mostly on the ﬂow-type indicators,
with the highest loading on the current account position, the key variable in this group. The banking
variable group has higher loadings on asset quality, income, bank external debt measures, as well as the
key variable, the bank risk indicator of B_EIU. However, it has very low loadings on capital adequacy and
liquidity measures, which would probably warrant extracting further factors in this group. The political-
institutional variable loadings are varied across variables, but the aggregate indices of EIU and Heritage
Foundation (the key variable is the HF Overall index) both have very high loadings, so that the factor can
well be interpreted as a general measure of the group. The ﬁscal position factor has high loadings on total
government debt ratio measures as well as the forecasted ﬁscal deﬁcit. The factor could be interpreted
as the total debt ratio, the group key variable. Interestingly the EIU sovereign risk index is not much
correlated with the factor.
An overall measure to assess the usefulness of using factors instead of individual variables is the
sum of correlation squares, which corrects for the number of variables in the group. This measure is an
eigenvalue-type indicator that points out how much more information the factor has than a single vari-
able in the group. For all factors this measure is well above one, suggesting that the factor approach is
appropriate.
3.4. Model of CDS spreads
In the case of a one-period contract, Edwards (1983) shows that if a logistic function is assumed
between the probability of default and fundamental variables, then the logarithm of the sovereign spread
can be expressed as a linear function of fundamental variables (Xt) pertaining to issuer and issue (bond
or loan-speciﬁc) characteristics and the logarithm of a term including the risk-free rate. More generally
then, the sovereign credit spreads (either bond spreads or CDS spreads) of a given country at a given time
period could be written as:
ln(spreadit) = ai + ct + bXit + dZi + 0Wt + uit , (3)
where Zi are time-invariant (cross-section speciﬁc) variables and Wt are cross-section invariant (time-
period speciﬁc) variables, such as systemic risk proxies. To estimate parameters, either cross-section
ﬁxed effects or time-invariant variables have to be dropped from the equation. Similarly, either period
ﬁxed effects or cross-section invariant variables have to be removed. The most common approach in
the literature is to drop time-invariant variables and period ﬁxed effects and estimate the model with
cross-section ﬁxed effects and cross-section invariant (time-period speciﬁc) variables, the VIX index for
instance.
We investigate various speciﬁcations. We aim to judge the full explanatory power of local funda-
mentals and much of that explanatory power lies in differentiating CDS spreads in the cross-section of
countries. Adding cross-section ﬁxed effects removes this component from the analysis, therefore our
main speciﬁcations do not include such effects. On the other hand the common time variation of funda-
mentals and CDS spreads is irrelevant from the point of view of local policymaking. We control for these
factors by using direct controls (global fundamental and global risk proxies) in some speciﬁcations and
including period ﬁxed effects in others.
4. Estimation results
We estimate several speciﬁcations of the model for CDS spreads outlined above. First, we look at
regressions in which the logarithm of CDS spreads are regressed on local fundamentals (the factor
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forecasts that include both the country-speciﬁc and common regional components), on global funda-
mental variables and global risk proxies. These regressions help us in gauging the explanatory power of
local fundamentals compared to that of global variables. Then we turn to regressions, where local funda-
mentals are segmented into country-speciﬁc and common regional components, and eventually focus on
the relative explanatory power of country-speciﬁc fundamentals, which are the indicators relevant for
policy-making.
4.1. Global and local factors in CDS spreads
There is an ongoing academic discussion about the relative role local and global factors play
in determining sovereign spreads (see Augustin, 2014, for a recent survey). An abundance of stud-
ies have pointed out the strong time series comovement of spreads (e.g. Broto and Pérez-Quirós,
2015; Kocsis, 2014; Longstaff et al., 2011; McGuire and Schrijvers, 2003 to cite a few). The sig-
niﬁcant correlation of the common component with global risk, global liquidity indicators as well
as with economic indicators of global importance, such as the US economic growth outlook, have
favoured arguments that global factors may be more important (Ang and Longstaff, 2011; Ebner, 2009;
González-Rozada and Yeyati, 2008; Weigel and Gemmill, 2006). There is consensus that global factors
are signiﬁcant drivers of spreads, nonetheless most studies in the literature also ﬁnd country-speciﬁc
fundamentals to be important determinants. Moreover, the recent literature shows that the impor-
tance of both country fundamentals and global factors are time-varying in nature (see references in
Section 2.2).
The ﬁrst set of our results provides new insights into the subject matter (Table 1). Model speci-
ﬁcation (1A) shows that all of the local fundamental factors are statistically important (and have the
expected positive sign3) in explaining deviations of log CDS spreads from the overall sample mean. These
fundamental factors are able to explain 71% of total CDS spread sample variance.
Regression (1B) adds indicators representing global fundamentals, which increases explained vari-
ance verifying that such variables do contain relevant additional information for spreads. The US GDP
growth and current account outlook are statistically signiﬁcant with the expected negative signs. The
principal component of developed and emerging (non-Eastern European) country sovereign risk indica-
tors, which proxies general trends in global ﬁscal fundamentals, is also signiﬁcant with the correct sign.
Regression (1C) adds global risk and liquidity proxies, such as the VIX index, and other potentially rel-
evant ﬁnancial variables. These variables also appear important for CDS spreads, though their inclusion
causes the sign reversal of the coeﬃcient of the US growth outlook and generally lowers signiﬁcance
of other global fundamentals, an effect of the high collinearity of global fundamental and global risk
indicators.
The explanatory power of regression drops sharply, however, when local fundamentals are omitted.
Speciﬁcation (1D) thus highlights the relative importance of local fundamentals compared with global
variables. Omitting local fundamental factors causes the variance explained by regression to drop from 86
to 21%. This is in clear contrast with speciﬁcation (1A) where the inclusion of local fundamentals without
global factors retains 71% of explained variance. The two speciﬁcations together favour the argument
that it is country fundamentals rather than global determinants that are more important in explaining
CDS spreads.
Regression (1E) points out that much of the greater explanatory power of local fundamentals derives
from explaining CDS spread differences in the country cross-section. In speciﬁcation (1E), where we
add cross-section ﬁxed effects to global factors, R2 rises back above 80%. Thus cross-section ﬁxed effects
successfully substitute most information in local fundamentals.
The model (1F) adds local fundamentals to the regressor list of the previous regression. Explained
variance increases further revealing that local fundamentals contain additional relevant information
3 Note that in our regressions all factors are signed so that increases indicate deterioration hence coeﬃcients in CDS spread
regressions should have a positive sign.
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Table 1
Regression results — local and global factors in CDS spreads.
Model
speciﬁcations:
(1A) (1B) (1C) (1D) (1E) (1F) (1G)
Local
fundamentals
Adding
global fund’s
Adding
global risk
Omitting
country fund’s
Adding
CX F.E.
Adding
local fund’s
AR(1)
resid’s
F_REAL 0.214∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.035) (0.063) (0.061) (0.051) (0.037)
F_EXTERN 0.344∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.097) (0.082)
F_FISCAL 0.188∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.04 0.101
(0.061) (0.06) (0.061) (0.133) (0.072)
F_INST 0.767∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.114 0.73∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.342) (0.08)
F_BANK 0.845∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) (0.344) (0.213)
US_GDP −0.103∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.018)
US_CA −0.467∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗ −0.005 −0.005 −0.227∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗
(0.113) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.066) (0.022)
PC SOV RISK 0.021∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.005 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
PC POL RISK −0.005 0.006 −0.002 −0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
PC BANK RISK −0.042∗∗∗ 0.003 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.003 0.016∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
VIX 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TED SPREAD 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.000
BBB SPREAD 0.314∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.021)
COMM. INDEX −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
BRENT OIL 0.025∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)* (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
AR(1) 0.939***
(0.012)
Period ﬁxed
effects
No No No No No No No
Cross-section No No No No Yes Yes No
R-squared 0.711 0.765 0.822 0.208 0.819 0.890 0.962
DW-statistic 0.152 0.233 0.327 0.065 0.285 0.546 2.097
Observations 949 949 949 949 949 949 936
Sample period Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Jan 2009–
Dec 2014
Sources: Authors’ calculations and data sources as listed in Appendix Table A1.
Notes: Dependent variables are log CDS spreads. The explanatory variables “F” denote 1-year ahead forecasts of country funda-
mental factors (including both their country-speciﬁc and common regional components) and are signed so that an increase is
consistent with deterioration, thus positive coeﬃcients are expected. Global fundamental variables include US real GDP growth,
current account to GDP forecasts (negative coeﬃcients expected) and principal components of risk indicators compiled by EIU
(positive coeﬃcients expected). Global risk indicators are the VIX index, US 3-month TED spread (money rate — benchmark), US
corporate BBB to Treasury spread, Goldman Sachs commodity index and Brent crude oil price (positive coeﬃcients expected). More
details on the data are provided in the Appendix. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Robust clustered standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted as usual:
∗ At the 10% level.
∗∗ At the 5% level (bold).
∗∗∗ At the 1% level.
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other than that about differences in cross-section means. The local fundamentals relating to the real
growth outlook, external balances and banking sector health are fundamentals statistically signiﬁcant
in this respect. The ﬁscal and the institutional-political factors on the other hand appear to be more
important for explaining cross-section variance. The last regression (1G) runs the same model with
AR(1) residuals instead of cross-section ﬁxed effects. Only the ﬁscal factor is insigniﬁcant of the ﬁve
country fundamentals in this setup, whereas signiﬁcance levels of global proxies are not materially
changed.
4.2. Common components of local fundamentals
The hierarchical factor model estimates local fundamental factors by segmenting them into country-
speciﬁc and common regional components. In Eq. (1) in Section 3.2 fundamental factors are denoted as
Fm,t, which are composed of a part that is correlated across countries in the region (denoted LG_): the
product of the common factor and the country sensitivity, KFGGt; as well as the part of fundamentals
speciﬁc to the country (denoted f_), which consists of the time-varying fm,t factor and the time-invariant
country-factor effect lFm. We use this segmentation of fundamental variables next to assess the nature of
fundamental impacts on spreads.
Bivariate correlations between the components of fundamentals and CDS spreads support above
arguments about the differences in the explanatory power of local fundamentals (Appendix Table A3).
Several of the country-speciﬁc fundamental factors, notably fINST, fEXTERN and fBANK, which proxy the
institutional-political background, the external balance outlook, and banking sector vulnerability, respec-
tively, all have high positive correlations with spreads. The factors representing the real growth outlook
and health of the banking sector health, are more correlated with CDS spreads through their com-
mon components (LGREAL and LGBANK). Strong co-movement of LGREAL with the US GDP growth forecast
and global/US ﬁnancial indicators, such as the VIX index, conﬁrm that the growth outlook of the East-
ern European region is highly dependent on global factors. Since causation plausibly runs from the
US indicators to Eastern European ones and not vice versa, much of the covariation seen between
the common components and CDS spreads should be attributed to global factors. However, as speci-
ﬁcation (1D) has attested, global factors themselves are able to explain only a smaller proportion of
CDS spreads due to large differences in cross-sectional means, which can only be grasped by local
factors.
Table 2 presents a second set of regressions. The ﬁrst two speciﬁcations, (2A) and (2B) include both
the country-speciﬁc and common regional components of local fundamental factors. Regression (2A)
also includes the global controls used in Table 1. Other than the real growth outlook, country-speciﬁc
fundamentals are signiﬁcant with the correct sign. As suggested by bivariate correlations, the real growth
outlook appears to be related to CDS spreadsmore through its common regional component. The banking
sector variable is important in both speciﬁcations via both of its components. Country-speciﬁc external
and ﬁscal fundamentals appear with the expected sign and are signiﬁcant, but they display counter-
intuitive coeﬃcients for the common components.
The counter-intuitive coeﬃcients of ﬁscal fundamentals and external balances in some CDS spread
regressions deserve attention. CDS spreads are bets on government debt not being repaid, so worse
ﬁscal fundamentals should be a key cause for higher CDS spreads. The likely explanation of con-
trary empirical evidence in some speciﬁcations is that more developed countries with deeper ﬁnancial
markets and better market-oriented institutions experience higher demand for their government secu-
rities than less developed countries, which enables them to run up and ﬁnance larger government
debt. Higher debt in countries with lower CDS spreads may thus be the consequence of omitting,
or not properly proxying factors related to such demand factors, institutions and level of ﬁnancial
development.
Such issue may as well be present in terms of the dynamic relations between fundamentals and CDS
spreads as well. In times of ﬁnancial stress (much of our sample) countries with weaker institutions
and lower levels of development may experience sharper falls in demand for their assets, simultane-
ously increasing sovereign spreads and forcing more prudent ﬁscal policies. Similar effects (and sudden
stops) could also lead to improving external balances and banking indicators in countries with higher and
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Table 2
Regression results — CDS spreads and country-speciﬁc fundamentals.
Model
speciﬁcations:
(2A) (2B) (2C) (2D) (2E) (2F) (2G)
Local and global
variables
Locals only Local
country-spec
Bank factor
omitted
Also inst.
omitted
Add GDP
CAP
Add RATING
RES
f_REAL 0.143* 0.098 0.204∗∗ 0.297** −0.051 0.359∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.078) (0.102) (0.124) (0.225) (0.095) (0.084)
f_EXTERN 0.284∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.208 0.215∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.049) (0.069) (0.092) (0.167) (0.072) (0.06)
f_FISCAL 0.239∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.126 −0.05 0.196∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.05) (0.071) (0.092) (0.175) (0.055) (0.043)
f_INST 0.754∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.06) (0.083) (0.108) (0.114) (0.089)
f_BANK 0.845∗∗∗ 1.001∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.18) (0.21) (0.183) (0.137)
GDP CAP −0.537∗∗∗ −0.537∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.144)
RATING RES 0.127∗∗∗
(0.036)
LG_REAL 0.291∗∗∗ 0.092
(0.092) (0.064)
LG_EXTERN −0.492∗∗ −0.295
(0.238) (0.247)
LG_FISCAL −0.889∗∗ −1.266∗∗∗
(0.447) (0.425)
LG_INST 0.727 1.435∗∗
(0.62) (0.597)
LG_BANK 1.416∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗
(0.458) (0.472)
Direct global
controls
Yes No No No No No No
Period ﬁxed
effects
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section
ﬁxed effects
No No No No No No No
R-squared 0.850 0.756 0.807 0.750 0.312 0.837 0.867
DW-statistic 0.386 0.188 0.069 0.055 0.019 0.085 0.099
Observations 949 949 949 949 949 949 949
Sample period Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Sources: Authors’ calculations and data sources as listed in Appendix Table A1.
Notes: Dependent variables are log CDS spreads. The explanatory variables “f_” denote 1-year ahead forecasts of the country-
speciﬁc components of fundamental factors. The variables “LG_” denote 1-year ahead forecasts of the common regional components
of fundamental factors. GDP_CAP denotes the log of 2009 USD GDP per capita. RATING RES is the residual of RATINGS regressed on
the same regressors as in speciﬁcation (2E). The ﬁrst speciﬁcation in the table, (2A), includes the same global explanatory variables
as the ones used in Table 1, but their coeﬃcients are not listed here to conserve space. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Robust
clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted as usual:
∗ At the 10% level.
∗∗ At the 5% level (bold).
∗∗∗ At the 1% level.
increasing CDS spreads, which may also lead to counter-intuitive correlations and regression coeﬃcients
if the true underlying factors are not controlled for.
4.3. The country-speciﬁc components and policy implications
Beginning with speciﬁcation (2C) we look at regressions with the country-speciﬁc part of fundamen-
tals and period ﬁxed effects. Period ﬁxed effects control common time series variations and hence focus
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the analysis on the effect of relative country-speciﬁc fundamentals on relative CDS spreads. This is the
part of fundamentals, which policymakers may possibly have an impact on.
All ﬁve fundamental factors are signiﬁcant, when restricting analysis to this smaller part of CDS
spread and fundamental variances (2C). The speciﬁcation (2D) omits the fundamental factor repre-
senting banking sector vulnerability. Although several recent empirical papers working on developed
markets have included proxies for banking sector health, such variables have been missing so far from
sovereign spread analyses in emerging markets. The reason probably is the diﬃculty in obtaining com-
parable, meaningful length balanced panel data. However, the methodology we use allows inclusion
of variables with various sample length, missing values and outliers. The omission of the banking fac-
tor only affects the signiﬁcance of the ﬁscal factor, though coeﬃcients of all fundamentals change
materially.
Omitting the institutional-political factor in speciﬁcation (2E) results in more dramatic changes. The
signiﬁcance of all remaining three fundamentals markedly decline. The coeﬃcients of fREAL and fFISCAL
switch sign, whereas the coeﬃcient of fEXTERN is halved. Leaving out the institutional-political factor thus
leads to severe omission bias in estimated parameter values.
Models (2F) adds a proxy for initial level of development, log of GDP per capita 2009, to the speci-
ﬁcation with all ﬁve fundamental factors on the regressor list. Such proxy for the level of development
should be and is correlated with the institutional factor, but there is clearly a difference between the
two concepts and the empirical correlation is also far from perfect (see Appendix Table A3). Level of
development also has an impact on other fundamentals (less developed countries tend to have higher
growth rates, worse external balances and higher external and government indebtedness through their
larger ﬁnancial depth) and so including this factor helps to separate these effects from the effects
of fundamentals we originally have in mind (lower growth rates, worse external and ﬁscal balances
should relate to higher sovereign spreads). This is all the more important regarding policy implica-
tions, because initial development level is obviously not in the scope of policymaking. For example it
would not be desirable for policymakers to take credit for relative higher growth, when it is only due
to lower level of initial development and real convergence. Coeﬃcients in speciﬁcation (2F) have the
intuitive sign and are signiﬁcant just as in (2C), although parameter values are statistically different
in most cases.
Controlling for the initial level of development and the institutional background is thus not only
necessary to obtain an estimate on the direct role that these variables play in sovereign spreads. They
are also needed in order to obtain proper estimates on the effect of other fundamental factors. We have
seen in Table 1 speciﬁcation (1E) that one possible way to resolve the omission bias of not including
such controls is through the use of cross-section ﬁxed effects. This is the mainstream approach of the
current literature on sovereign spreads. Unfortunately, inclusion of cross section ﬁxed effects comes at
the cost of losing the information that fundamentals contain about cross-sectional differences in CDS
spreads. Neglecting this part of the relationship leads to lower estimates for the importance of local
factors and may also lead one to believe that global fundamentals explain most of the variation in CDS
spreads. Although this may be true for the time series variation in CDS spreads from cross sectional
means, it also appears to be less than half of the full story.
Model (2G) also adds the information content of sovereign credit ratings. We follow Eichengreen
and Mody (1998) in using only the part of ratings that is orthogonal to fundamentals. This method
calculates the residual term of the regression of ratings on the same set of fundamental variables that
are used in sovereign CDS spread regressions. Due to uncorrelatedness, including the orthogonalised
part of ratings in CDS spread regressions does not affect coeﬃcient point estimates of the fundamental
variables, but it does decrease the error term of the regression. The included variable thus collects
information in ratings that are correlated with CDS spreads but are missing from fundamentals data (e.g.
tail risks to the fundamental outlook, non-linearities in fundamental effects), and hence the variance
share of the included RATING RES variable may report on the signiﬁcance of such left out factors.
A natural question relating to this line of argumentation is why the same fundamental factors
could have different coeﬃcients in explaining the time series versus the cross-section variance of
CDS spreads. If there was a data generating process with ﬁxed coeﬃcients of fundamentals on CDS
spreads, then these coeﬃcients should apply across country differences as well as time differences. In
other words, the between- and within-effects estimators of the relationship should be the same. This
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Table 3
Additional regressions — robustness checks.
Model
speciﬁcations:
(3A) (3B) (3C) (3D) (3E) (3F)
5-year factor
forecast
2009–2011
sample
2012–2014
sample
Excl UA,
excl crisis
FGLS period
weights
FGLS cross-sect.
weights
f_REAL 0.568∗∗∗ 0.179 0.659∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.117) (0.179) (0.111) (0.022) (0.045)
f_EXTERN 0.225∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.127 0.208∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.069) (0.106) (0.075) (0.014) (0.022)
f_GDEBT 0.246∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.071) (0.055) (0.012) (0.016)
f_INST 0.526∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.115) (0.132) (0.115) (0.02) (0.033)
f_BANK 0.299* 0.843∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.238) (0.181) (0.182) (0.03) (0.058)
GDPCAPL −0.504∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗ −0.515∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.190) (0.216) (0.231) (0.034) (0.062)
Period ﬁxed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross-section
ﬁxed effects
No No No No No No
R-squared 0.866 0.818 0.887 0.817 0.811 0.597
DW-statistic 0.100 0.087 0.126 0.097 0.112 0.145
Observations 949 481 468 732 949 949
Sample period Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2011
Jan 2012–
Dec 2014
Dec 2009–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Dec 2008–
Dec 2014
Sources: Authors’ calculations and data sources as listed in Appendix Table A1.
Notes: Dependent variables are log CDS spreads. The explanatory variables “f_” denote 1-year ahead forecasts of the country-
speciﬁc components of fundamental factors. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes factor forecasts averaged over the 1–5 year horizon.
The second and third regressions are split sample estimates. The fourth speciﬁcation drops Ukraine from the sample as well as the
2009 period. Regressions are estimated by OLS in the ﬁrst 4 speciﬁcations and by FGLS using period and cross section weights in
the last two regressions. Robust clustered standard errors are reported for the ﬁrst four speciﬁcations and White robust errors for
the last two. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted as usual:
∗ At the 10% level.
∗∗ At the 5% level (bold).
∗∗∗ At the 1% level.
contradiction can be resolved with the time-variation of parameters.4 Such parameter time variation
has been empirically demonstrated by several papers in the literature and it is what we demonstrate
on our data sample in the next subsection.
To conclude regression results, we brieﬂy cover a third set of speciﬁcations that checks the robustness
of the model (2F) results (Table 3). The ﬁrst column shows estimates of a regression with fundamental
factor mean forecasts of 1 to 5 years instead of the 1-year forecasts used throughout the text. The
fundamentals on the full 1 to 5 years horizon are relevant for 5-year CDS spreads, although we chose
the 1-year forecasts to be consistent with the horizon of the Consensus Economics forecasts. The
results are similar compared to the baseline model. The next two regressions provide split sample
estimates and suggests strong time variance of parameter estimates. The fourth speciﬁcation drops
4 Suppose for instance that a single, positive variable determines the level of CDS spreads with a positive coeﬃcient.
Suppose also that a structural change increases the coeﬃcient of the variable to a higher level, but the variable itself does not
change in the observed sample. Then, the increase of the coeﬃcient causes an increase of CDS spreads. In such a case, the
estimated coeﬃcient would be zero for the time series estimation (the within estimator), because the CDS spread changes
whereas the regressor does not. The cross-section (between estimator) would in this case provide a different, and better
estimate of the relationship since it would effectively relate the cross-section of regressor means to the cross-section of CDS
spread means, which would still be positive.
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Ukraine and the 2009 year of the crisis. The rationale for checking this speciﬁcation is that the variance
of Ukrainian CDS spreads stands out in the cross-section dimension, whereas the year 2009 exhibited
the largest time variation of CDS spreads. In a similar spirit FGLS estimation is performed in the last
two regressions to see whether downweighting of observations with larger absolute errors would lead
to different results. Neither of the last three regressions seem to conﬂict results in model (2F).
4.4. The relative importance of fundamental factors and their temporal evolution
As reviewed in Section 2.2 several papers in the literature emphasized the time-varying nature of the
relationship between sovereign spreads and explanatory variables.
To investigate time-variation of parameters in our sample we estimate the speciﬁcation (2F) on
rolling windows of 2-year ﬁxed lengths. We assess the changing economic signiﬁcance of fundamental
country-speciﬁc factors by their contribution to relative CDS spreads. For each estimation window
and each regressor we multiply the estimated coeﬃcient with the ratio of the standard deviation of
the regressor and the CDS spread on the given subsample. This measures how much a one-standard
deviation increase in the regressor increases CDS spreads, also measured in standard deviations. The
measure can be understood as assessing the relative importance of factors both compared to other
factors and compared to different time samples.
The evolution of explanatory variable effects on CDS spreads are displayed in Fig. 1. On the whole,
the institutional-political background stands out as having consistently had the greatest economic sig-
niﬁcance in the whole period. Initial level of development, the external and ﬁscal factors have also been
relatively more important though their relative signiﬁcance has changed considerably throughout the
sample period. These results are consistent with the split sample estimates in Table 3.
The ﬁndings seem to contradict other studies, which usually ﬁnd an increase of fundamental effects
on spreads (e.g. Bobetko et al., 2013, Dumicˇic´ and Rizdak, 2011, Heinz and Sun, 2014, for Eastern
European countries). We only ﬁnd this to be true for the institutional-political factor. The differences
are perhaps simply due to the time sample used. Our sample begins after the crisis, while more of
the ﬁndings of increased sensitivity in the literature relate to comparisons of pre- and post-crisis
Fig. 1. Temporal evolution of the relative economic signiﬁcance of fundamental factors.
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samples. Our ﬁndings that the role of the ﬁscal determinant decreases after a peak in 2011–2013
may be due to a decline of volatility and an easing of the sovereign crisis in the second half of our
sample.
Another reason may be that here we are working with the country-speciﬁc parts of fundamentals.
The ﬁnding of Heinz and Sun (2014) that real activity is highly important in determining spreads may
be true on our data set as well, if we did not exclude the common component of variables. The common
component of real activity fundamentals are particularly large compared to other fundamentals. Still
another possibility for differences with other studies is the inclusion of more banking-related and
institutional-political variables in our explanatory data set.
5. Application of the model: case studies of Poland, Russia and Turkey
In the following, we turn to the application of our model to the three countries with the largest
economies in our sample: Poland, Russia and Turkey.
Poland had lower-than-average CDS spreads in the whole sample, while Russian and Turkish spreads
were in most of the sample close to the regional average, although Russian spreads were signiﬁcantly
higher in the beginning and end of our time sample. All of these countries’ CDS spreads showed similar
dynamics for the largest part of the time-sample due to a strong regional component (Fig. 2, lower
Fig. 2. Relative and absolute CDS spreads.
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panel). However, dynamics of relative CDS movements, CDS spreads compared to the sample average,
were much more varied (Fig. 2, upper panel).
The dominant underlying determinants of CDS spread levels were different in these countries accord-
ing to our model. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics and model-implied contributions to relative CDS
spreads.
Poland’s relative CDS spread was the lowest of the three investigated countries in most of our
time sample and was lower than the cross-section sample average CDS spread in the whole period.
Almost every fundamental factor showed better-than-average values. Thus the relatively low spreads
lay on a wide basis of relative fundamentals. The strongest factor acting to decrease relative CDS
spreads was the country’s rating residual (RATING RES). The rating residual signiﬁes factors which
are not represented in the model by our fundamental variables, but which contributed to both better
ratings and CDS spreads. Such factors may have been the presence of an IMF-FCL facility and a strict
ﬁscal rule, which could have reduced long-term tail risks. Perhaps there was a non-linear extra effect
relating to the real growth outlook: Poland was the only country not to experience a recession, which
could have helped CDS spreads above the linear effect included in the model. On the other hand, the
model-implied relative CDS was worsened by the ﬁscal (fFISCAL) factor.
Russia’s relative CDS spread was quite near to the cross-section sample average for most of the
period, and above average at the beginning and the end of the time sample. The key factors contributing
to a lower CDS spread were the strong external position of the country due to its energy resources,
as well as the favourable ﬁscal and growth factors. The relative stability of the banking sector also
contributed favourably. According to our model, the key factor that worsened the relative CDS spread
was the political-institutional factor. The Russian political-institutional factor was the weakest of the
13 countries, even weaker than the similar indicator of Ukraine, throughout the whole period under
review.
Turkey’s relative CDS spread hovered near the cross-section sample average throughout the exam-
ined period. Turkey’s banking sector health and real growth factors were favourable for relative
spreads. The largest adverse contributions to model-implied relative CDS spreads were those of the
political-institutional environment, the rating residuals and the ﬁscal position.
Model estimates of relative CDS spreads can change in time because of two reasons: changing
fundamentals and changing estimated parameters (the latter a consequence of shifts in investor prefer-
ences). To quantify the two distinct effects, similarly to other studies (e.g. Beirne and Fratzscher (2013),
Eichengreen and Mody (1998)) we use the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973).
In particular we decompose the difference between the model-implied mean value for the two split
sample periods, December 2009–December 2011 and January 2012–December 2014. Applied to our
Table 4
Descriptive statistics.
Country Statistic log(CDS) fREAL fEXTERN fFISCAL fINST fBANK GDPCAP RATINGRES
Poland Average −0.483 −0.331 −0.349 0.794 −0.114 −0.135 0.105 −1.749
Standard deviation 0.197 0.194 0.171 0.112 0.081 0.081 0.000 0.316
Impact on CDS spread −0.119 −0.075 0.156 −0.057 −0.072 −0.056 −0.222
Russia Mean −0.004 −0.517 −2.504 −1.124 1.899 −0.238 −0.185 −0.075
Standard deviation 0.309 0.273 0.273 0.082 0.061 0.058 0.000 0.197
Contribution to CDS spread −0.186 −0.539 −0.221 0.951 −0.128 0.099 −0.009
Turkey Mean −0.028 −0.382 0.052 0.628 0.392 −0.472 −0.178 1.443
Standard deviation 0.219 0.319 0.375 0.323 0.078 0.076 0.000 0.987
Contribution to CDS spread −0.137 0.011 0.123 0.196 −0.253 0.095 0.183
Memo: Model (2F) coeﬃcient 0.359 0.215 0.196 0.501 0.537 −0.537 0.127
Sources: authors’ calculations.
Notes: Factors are signed so that a negative factor value denotes fundamentals that are better than the regional average.
Contributions to relative CDS spreads are calculated as the product of the mean of the regressor and its coeﬃcient in Model (2F).
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context the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition separates the effect of changing parameters, b2 − b1, and
changing fundamentals, X2 − X1, in the following way:
CDS2 − CDS1 = b2X2 − b1X1 = b2X2 − b1X1 − b1X2 + b1X2 =
= (b2 − b1)X2 + (X2 − X1)b1 (4)
where b1 and b2 denote the parameter estimates and X1 and X2 represent the average fundamental
values on the respective subsamples.
Fig. 3 presents the result of such decompositions. The decrease in the model-implied values of the
relative Polish CDS spreads between the two periods was mainly the result of improving banking sector
stability, a favourable change in the real growth parameter and the institution-political background
lowering CDS spreads through both channels. In Russia, the increase in CDS spreads was mostly due
to parameter changes: investor preferences shifted to give larger weight to the institutional factor, the
weakest point of Russia, whereas the parameter of the external position, a key positive, decreased.
The increased coeﬃcient of the growth factor favourably affected Russia just like Poland and Turkey.
In Turkey factors explained by ratings but not our fundamentals caused an improvement in the rating
residual, however the unfavourable decrease in the banking sector’s parameter resulted in largely
unchanged model-implied spreads.
a)
b) c)
Fig. 3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of relative CDS spread changes.
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6. Conclusions
We study the role that country fundamental variables have in determining sovereign CDS spreads.
We use a hierarchical dynamic factor model to construct aggregate fundamental factors of ﬁve groups
of country-speciﬁc fundamental variables. The groups relate to the real growth outlook; the external
balances of the country; the ﬁscal position of the government; the vulnerability of the banking sector; and
the institutional strength and political stability of the country. The method is useful in handling various
data issues that are especially relevant in emergingmarkets data, it offers a straightforwardway to create
forward-looking factors (1-year ahead factor forecasts) based on both published variables and survey
forecasts, and it allows separation of country-speciﬁc and common regional components of fundamentals.
Regressions of CDS spreads on fundamental factor forecasts suggest that local fundamentals are
more important in explaining CDS spreads than are global factors. The speciﬁcation that includes
local factors but excludes global determinants explains 71% of CDS variance, whereas the reversed
speciﬁcation enlisting only global factors as regressors accounts for only 23% of spread variation. Global
fundamentals, as well as usual global risk and ﬁnancial indicators, appear important in accounting for
the time series variation of CDS spreads. Yet much of the variance of spreads rather relates to differences
in cross-section means, which are well accounted for by local fundamentals. The institutional-political
background and ﬁscal conditions appear to be especially important factors in this regard. The use of
cross-section ﬁxed effects, the mainstream approach in the literature, successfully substitutes these
effects, but this practice also conceals much of the explanatory power of country-speciﬁc fundamentals.
Moreover such within-estimates may also be biased for persistent fundamental factors with time-
variation in their effects on sovereign spreads. Split sample estimates and rolling-window estimates
support the case for time-variation of fundamental effects on spreads, though proper treatment of this
issue lies out of the scope of the paper. Integrating time-variation of parameters explicitly into the
model may constitute an interesting extension.
To be useful for policy purposes the country-speciﬁc components of fundamentals have to be
considered. Looking at this part of fundamentals and CDS spreads, all ﬁve fundamentals are found to
be statistically signiﬁcant in most regression speciﬁcations. The fact that more developed countries
have larger access to foreign credit and experience larger demand for their assets blurs the relationship
between some of the fundamentals (notably the ﬁscal and external position) and sovereign spreads.
To recover true partial effects we ﬁnd it useful to include initial level of development in the model.
This also has the beneﬁt of abstracting from the part of fundamentals that are not in the scope of
policymaking. Regarding economic signiﬁcance (the effect of fundamental factors measured in standard
deviation units) the factor representing institutional-political strength of countries appears to be the
most important fundamental factor. The ﬁscal position had the second largest economic signiﬁcance
for much of the sample, peaking at the height of the eurozone sovereign crisis, and declining in relative
importance since. Of course to provide meaningful policy recommendations this type of analysis should
be integrated into a wider modelling framework that also assesses the costs of reaching a given impact
on the fundamental factor.
We apply the model to investigate CDS spreads of the three largest economies in our data set:
Poland, Russia and Turkey. Poland had lower-than-average CDS spreads due to favourable values onmost
fundamentals. Russia’s relative CDS spreadwas near the regional average formost of the period. Although
the political-institutional factor was extremely weak, the weakest of the 13 countries, this was countered
by relatively strong other fundamentals, especially the strong external position due to energy resources.
Key positives for the Turkish CDS spread were banking sector health and real growth factors, while
the political-institutional environment and the ﬁscal position acted to increase spreads. Oaxaca–Blinder
decompositions on the spread changes of these countries suggest that besides changing fundamentals,
the time-variation of fundamental effects due to changing investor preferences signiﬁcantly contributed
to changes of relative spreads. A case at hand is Russia, where an increasing effect of institutions-politics
and lower effects of the external position explained much of the increase in CDS spreads.
Our data set conﬁnes the analysis and results to the Eastern European region. It would be interest-
ing to see whether fundamental effects on sovereign spreads estimated with a similar methodology are
different in other emerging market regions or in the group of developed countries.
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Table A1
Appendix A. Additional tables and ﬁgures
Data.
No. Mnemonic Variable Original frequency d Variable groupe Data source Publication lead/lag Availability
1 CDSL Log 5-year CDS spread Daily BBG 0 Start–2015 q3
2 dGDP Real GDP growth projection Monthly F_REAL, key CE 12 m lead 2007 q2–2015 q3
3 dCons Real consumption growth projection Monthly F_REAL CE 12 m lead 2007 q2–2015 q3
4 dINV Investment growth projection Monthly F_REAL CE 12 m lead 2007 q2–2015 q3
5 dIND Industrial production projection Monthly F_REAL CE 12 m lead 2007 q2–2015 q3
6 CA Current account balance projection (/GDPa) Monthly F_EXTERN, key CE, IMF IFS 12 m lead 2007 q2–2015 q3
7 TRBAL Trade balance projection (/GDPa) Monthly F_EXTERN CE, IMF IFS 12 m lead 2007 q2–2015 q3
8 EDGDP External debt (/GDPa) Quarterly F_EXTERN WB QEDS 4 m lag Start–2015 q1
9 RES Oﬃcial reserves (/GDPa) Quarterly F_EXTERN IMF IFS 4 m lag Start–2015 q2
10 TRBAL_ROG 2009 trade bal/GDP of oil + ref.oil + gas Cross-section CIA WF 0
11 TR_BRENT TRBAL_ROG × BRENT Daily F_EXTERN CIA WF, BBG 0 Start–2015 q3
12 BEDGDP Bank sector external debt (/GDPa) Quarterly F_BANK WB QEDS 4 m lag Start–2015 q2
13 BSEDGDP Bank sector short-term external debt (/GDPa) Quarterly F_BANK WB QEDS 4 m lag Start–2015 q2
14 B_EUI EIU, bank risk index Monthly F_BANK, key BBG, EIU 0 Start–2015 q3
15 ROA Return on assets Quarterly/annualc F_BANK IMF FSI 5 m lag 2008 q4–2014 q3
16 ROE return on equity Quarterly/annualc F_BANK IMF FSI 5 m lag 2008 q4–2014 q3
17 CAP_ADEQ1 Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets Quarterly F_BANK IMF IFS 5 m lag 2008 q4–2014 q3
18 CAP_ADEQ2 Regulatory tier 1 capital to assets Quarterly F_BANK IMF IFS 5 m lag 2008 q4–2014 q3
19 LIQUID1 Liquid assets to short-term liabilities Quarterly F_BANK IMF FSI 5 m lag 2008 q4–2014 q3
20 LIQUID1 Liquid assets to total assets Quarterly F_BANK IMF FSI 5 m lag 2008 q4–2014 q3
21 NPL1 Non-performing loans net of prov. to capital Quarterly F_BANK IMF FSI 5 m lag 2008 q4–2014 q3
22 NPL2 Non-performing loans to total gross loans Quarterly F_BANK IMF FSI 5 m lag 2008 q4–2014 q3
23 P_EUI EIU, POLITICAL risk index Monthly F_INST, key BBG, EIU 0 Start–2015 q3
24 P_HOV HFI EF, overall score Annual F_INST HF 6 m lag Start–2014 q2
25 P_HFC HFI EF, freedom from corruption Annual F_INST HF 6 m lag Start–2014 q2
26 P_HFISF HFI EF, ﬁscal freedom Annual F_INST HF 6 m lag Start–2014 q2
27 P_HGS HFI EF, government spending Annual F_INST HF 6 m lag Start–2014 q2
28 P_HBF HFI EF, business freedom Annual F_INST HF 6 m lag Start–2014 q2
29 P_HLF HFI EF, labor freedom Annual F_INST HF 6 m lag Start–2014 q2
30 P_HMF HFI EF, monetary freedom Annual F_INST HF 6 m lag Start–2014 q2
(continued on next page)
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31 P_HTF HFI EF, trade freedom Annual F_INST HF 6 m lag Start–2014 q2
32 S_EUI EIU, SOVEREIGN risk index Monthly F_FISCAL BBG, EIU 0 Start–2015 q3
33 GGD_fwd Forward-looking gov’t gross debt to GDPb Monthly F_FISCAL CE, IMF IFS 12 m lead 2007 q2–2015 q3
34 FISCBAL Fiscal balance (/GDPa) projection Monthly F_FISCAL CE 12 m lead 2007 q2–2015 q3
35 GGALL Gov’t bonds and loans outstanding (/GDPa) Daily F_FISCAL, key BBG, IMF IFS 0 2007 q3–2015 q3
36 GGBOND Gov’t bonds outstanding (/GDPa) Daily F_FISCAL BBG, IMF IFS 0 2007 q3–2015 q3
37 GG_FXBOND Gov’t FX bonds outstanding (/GDPa) Daily F_FISCAL BBG, IMF IFS 0 2007 q3–2015 q3
38 GG_SHBOND Gov’t short-term bonds outstanding (/GDPa) Daily F_FISCAL BBG, IMF IFS 0 2007 q3–2015 q3
39 GG_SHFXBOND Gov’t short-term FX bonds outstanding (/GDPa) Daily F_FISCAL BBG, IMF IFS 0 2007 q3–2015 q3
40 RATM_lin Moody’s credit rating, linear scale (1 = Aaa, 2 = Aa1, . . . ) Daily RATLIN_AVG BBG 0 Start–2014 q2
41 RATS_lin S&P credit rating, linear scale (1 = AAA, 2 = AA+, . . . ) Daily RATLIN_AVG BBG 0 Start–2014 q2
42 RATF_lin Fitch credit rating, linear scale (1 = AAA, 2 = AA+, . . . ) Daily RATLIN_AVG BBG 0 Start–2014 q2
43 GDP CAP End-2009 GDP per capita, US dollars Cross-section WB 0
44 US GDP US GDP 12 m-ahead projection Monthly GLOBAL FUND BBG 12 m lead Start–2015 q3
45 US CA US CA 12 m-ahead projection Monthly GLOBAL FUND BBG 12 m lead Start–2007 q4
46 PC BANK EIUf PC of EIU bank risk indicators Monthly GLOBAL FUND BBG, EIU 0 Start–2015 q3
47 PC POL EIUf PC of EIU POL risk indicators Monthly GLOBAL FUND BBG, EIU 0 Start–2015 q3
48 PC SOV EIUa PC of EIU SOVEREIGN risk indicators Monthly GLOBAL FUND BBG, EIU 0 Start–2015 q3
49 VIX VIX index Daily GLOBAL OTHER BBG 0 Start–2015 q3
50 TED SPR 3 month US money market to treasury spread Daily GLOBAL OTHER BBG 0 Start–2015 q3
51 BBB SPR US BBB corporate to treasury spread Daily GLOBAL OTHER BBG, CSI 0 Start–2015 q3
52 GS_COMM Goldman Sachs commodity index Daily GLOBAL OTHER BBG, GS 0 Start–2015 q3
53 BRENT Brent crude oil price, next delivery Daily GLOBAL OTHER WB 0 Start–2015 q3
Data sources: BBG: Bloomberg, ce: Consensus Economics, CSI: Common Systems Inc., EIU: Economist Intelligence Unit, IMF IFS: International Financial Statistics, IMF FSI: the Financial Stability
Indicators, HF: Heritage Foundation, WB QEDS: World Bank Quarterly External Debt Statistics, CIA WF: CIA World Factbook.
a GDP is a 4-quarter calculated nominal GDP measure ending at the given quarter.
b The forward-looking debt ratio is calculated by taking t − 1 year’s debt-ratio and calculating the t − year and t + 1 year ratios using CE projections of actual and next years’ ﬁscal balance,
CPI (as a proxy of GDP deﬂator) and GDP real growth. From the t and t + 1 projections the 12-month projection is calculated as in the case of other CE projections (see main text).
c Annual available only for: Bulgaria and Russia.
d For daily variables the close on the 23rd of the month is taken so that Consensus Economics projections (usually published around the 15–20th of the month) are already available. For
other series on monthly–annual frequency the end of previous month values are aligned with CDS spreads (and CE surveys) of the actual month.
e The variable group indicates the factor a variable loads on. ‘Key’ indicates a key variable of a group.
f Principal component of indicators of France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Japan, USA, UK, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Argentina.
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Table A2
Correlations (fundamental variables and factors).
F_REAL F_EXTERN F_BANK F_INST F_FISCAL
dGDP 0.955 CA 0.890 BEDGDP 0.570 P_EUI 0.874 S_EUI 0.151
dCons 0.902 TRBAL 0.799 BSEDGDP 0.529 P_HOV 0.960 GGD_fwd 0.500
dINV 0.937 EDGDP 0.374 B_EUI 0.428 P_HFC 0.858 FISCBAL 0.896
dIND 0.881 RES 0.179 ROA 0.573 P_HFISF 0.218 GGALL 0.951
TR_BRENT 0.748 ROE 0.598 P_HGS 0.003 GGBOND 0.952
CAP_ADEQ1 −0.066 P_HBF 0.755 GG_FXBOND 0.692
CAP_ADEQ2 0.079 P_HLF 0.398 GG_SHBOND 0.848
LIQUID1 0.201 P_HMF 0.719 GG_SHFXBOND 0.528
LIQUID1 0.350 P_HTF 0.625
NPL1 0.639
NPL2 0.728
Mean of correlation coeﬃcients 0.919 0.598 0.421 0.601 0.690
Mean of squares of correlation coeﬃcients 0.845 0.433 0.235 0.456 0.546
Sum of correlation squares 3.381 2.163 2.585 4.106 4.364
Sources: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Bivariate Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients. Factors “F_” denote the country fundamental factors, which include both country-speciﬁc and regional components.
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Table A3
Correlations (variables used in regressions).
CDSL RATING AVG f_REAL f_EXTERN f_FISCAL f_INST f_BANK GDP CAP LG_REAL LG_EXTERN LG_FISCAL LG_BANK LG_INST
CDSL 1.00 0.77 0.09 0.28 −0.09 0.46 0.23 −0.62 0.39 −0.17 −0.16 0.32 0.19
RATING AVG 0.77 1.00 −0.09 0.28 −0.06 0.61 0.15 −0.81 0.12 −0.20 0.04 0.12 0.00
f_REAL 0.09 −0.09 1.00 0.38 0.16 −0.44 0.32 0.39 0.05 −0.34 0.08 0.16 0.24
f_EXTERN 0.28 0.28 0.38 1.00 −0.07 −0.41 0.40 −0.14 0.05 −0.53 0.06 −0.01 0.40
f_FISCAL −0.09 −0.06 0.16 −0.07 1.00 −0.29 −0.26 0.35 −0.11 0.33 −0.12 0.17 −0.03
f_INST 0.46 0.61 −0.44 −0.41 −0.29 1.00 −0.26 −0.69 0.06 0.25 −0.05 0.12 −0.39
f_BANK 0.23 0.15 0.32 0.40 −0.26 −0.26 1.00 −0.08 0.08 −0.50 0.33 −0.44 0.31
GDP CAP −0.62 −0.81 0.39 −0.14 0.35 −0.69 −0.08 1.00 −0.11 0.10 0.03 −0.03 0.04
LG_REAL 0.39 0.12 0.05 0.05 −0.11 0.06 0.08 −0.11 1.00 0.02 −0.34 0.52 0.28
LG_EXTERN −0.17 −0.20 −0.34 −0.53 0.33 0.25 −0.50 0.10 0.02 1.00 −0.39 0.10 −0.37
LG_FISCAL −0.16 0.04 0.08 0.06 −0.12 −0.05 0.33 0.03 −0.34 −0.39 1.00 −0.38 −0.06
LG_BANK 0.32 0.12 0.16 −0.01 0.17 0.12 −0.44 −0.03 0.52 0.10 −0.38 1.00 0.10
LG_INST 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.40 −0.03 −0.39 0.31 0.04 0.28 −0.37 −0.06 0.10 1.00
US GDP −0.34 0.01 −0.03 −0.05 0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.75 −0.20 0.45 −0.36 −0.19
US CA −0.30 −0.01 −0.12 −0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.28 0.17 0.26 −0.29 −0.44
PC SOV RISK −0.26 0.00 0.01 −0.04 0.01 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.46 −0.05 0.27 −0.27 −0.18
PC POL RISK −0.33 −0.01 −0.13 −0.04 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.48 0.15 0.29 −0.38 −0.45
PC BANK RISK 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.45 −0.11 −0.18 0.30 0.28
VIX 0.41 −0.01 0.05 0.04 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.52 0.08 −0.40 0.32 0.29
TED SPR 0.37 −0.01 −0.00 0.04 −0.01 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.45 0.19 −0.38 0.25 0.18
BBB SPR 0.41 −0.00 0.07 0.05 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.75 0.11 −0.46 0.41 0.30
GS_COMM −0.22 −0.01 −0.06 −0.03 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.65 −0.05 0.33 −0.33 −0.15
BRENT −0.25 −0.01 −0.09 −0.03 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.72 −0.02 0.36 −0.40 −0.23
Sources: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Bivariate Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcients. Factors “f_” denote the country-speciﬁc part of fundamental factors. Factors “LG_” denote the component of fundamental factors related to
the common regional factor.
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Appendix B. Derivation of the EM algorithm for cross-sectionally uncorrelated panel data
We apply the transformation of fundamental variables described in the text: y˜m,t = ym,t − lym −
KyFlFm − KyFKFGGt . Then, the dynamic factor model of Eq. (1) can be written succinctly as:
y˜m,t = K˜f˜m,t + nm,t , nm,t ∼ N(0,R),
f˜m,t = Ãf˜m,t−1 + g˜m,t , g˜m,t ∼ N(0, Q˜), (B.1)
where K˜ = [KyF , I], f˜m,t = [ fm,t , em,t]′, Ã =
[
Af 0
0 Ae
]
, g˜m,t = [g
f
m,t ,g
e
m,t]
′, Q˜ =
[
Qf 0
0 Qf
]
. Parameters of the
model are h = {K˜, Ã, Q˜}, while R is a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements j, a ﬁxed and very small
number.
This model has the complete data likelihood:
log L(y˜| f˜ , h) = − 1
2
log |S| − 1
2
M∑
m=1
f˜0,mS−1 f˜0,m − TM2 log |Q˜ | −
TM
2
log|R|−
− 1
2
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
( f˜m,t − Ãf˜m,t−1)′Q˜−1( f˜m,t − Ãf˜m,t−1)
− 1
2
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
(y˜m,t − K˜f˜m,t)′R−1(y˜m,t − K˜f˜m,t). (B.2)
In the iterations of the EM algorithm the likelihood function is ﬁrst evaluated using the smoothed
series of factors based on parameters from the previous iteration (E step) and then, the likelihood is
maximised with respect to the parameters (M step). This iteration is continued until the improvement of
the likelihood is minimal.
We use the Kalman smoother to recover the factor time series and to evaluate the likelihood, which is
appropriate given the assumption of Gaussian error terms and linearity of the state space form. For each
country in the panel the factors are ﬁltered forward from the beginning of the data set’s time sample
from an initial diffuse prior. When the end of the time sample is reached a backward recursion smooths
the factors. The updating steps in the algorithm update the factors compared to model-based prediction
based on the prediction-error of observed data. Thus for each country-time point variables with missing
values do not contribute to the likelihood.
Maximising the likelihood with respect to parameters is carried out in the M step by considering the
smoothed factor time series as observed data in the model. First note that each country — time sample
observation contributes individually to the likelihood since the innovation of factors, g˜, and variables, n,
are independent across time and cross-section by assumption. Uncorrelatedness of the panel is a result
of the transformation of the original variables, due to which cross-country correlations are eliminated.
We write the part of the likelihood in Eq. (B.2) that contains K˜ by expanding K˜f˜m,t:
−1
2
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
(y˜m,t − KyF fm,t − em,t)′R−1(y˜m,t − KyF fm,t − em,t)
Our loading matrix is set up with block-zero restrictions so that in each row of K only one element is
different from zero. Therefore each variable is inﬂuenced by only one of the factors. Denoting this factor
as fj(i) for the variable yi and using the fact that the inverse of R is diagonal with diagonal elements 1/j
we can write equivalently to the above:
−1
2
N∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
1
j
(y˜i,m,t − kyFi,j(i)fj(i),m,t − ei,m,t)2
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Thus for each variable we have a function of an individual scalar ki,j(i). This is maximised by the OLS
estimate,
kˆyFi,j(i) =
Cov(y˜i,m,t − ei,m,t , fj(i),m,t)
Var(fj(i),m,t)
, (B.3)
where the covariance and variance terms are calculated for all observed y˜i,m,t . For missing values of y˜i,m,t
our best guess of such value is ˆ˜yi,m,t = kyFi,j(i) fj(i),m,t − ei,m,t , but then this element of the sum is zero. Such
an estimate of y˜i,m,t therefore does not inﬂuence the likelihood and is uninformative of the parameters,
so that these country-time period points can be ignored.
Estimation of Af and Ae is analogous to KyF since these matrices can be viewed as having block-zero
parameter restrictions as well. As our factors and the idiosyncratic terms are orthogonal by assumption,
each row of Af and Ae is restricted to have a non-zero element only for its own lagged value. As in the case
of KyF, the part of the likelihood in Eq. (B.2) that contains the autoregressive parameters can be broken
down into independent factor-by-factor contributions:
−1
2
K∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
1
s2fj
( fj,m,t − a fi,ifj,m,t−1)2,
and similarly for idiosyncratic terms, Ae and ei,m,t. Then, autoregressive coeﬃcients are the OLS estimates
of regression between contemporaneous and lagged factor and idiosyncratic term time series.
Âj =
Cov( fj,m,t , fj,m,t−1)
Var( fj,m,t−1)
, aˆi =
Cov(ei,m,t , ei,m,t−1)
Var(ei,m,t−1)
(B.4)
A difference compared to KˆyF in this case is that estimation is based on pooling factor estimates from
all countries and the full time sample (bar ﬁrst values for in each country due to the AR(1) lag) because
there are no missing values.
In the case of estimation of the variance matrix, Q˜ , we again note that the unrestricted diagonal ele-
ments of the matrix, s2
g
f
j
and s2
gej
, are separately estimable in the likelihood function (the off-diagonal
elements are restricted to zero due to independence assumptions). A factor-by-factor separation of the
error terms leads to the usual ML estimates of regression residual variances based on the sample variance
of the error terms:
sˆ2
g f ,j = Var(g
f
j,m,t), sˆ
2
ge ,i = Var(g
e
i,m,t), (B.5)
where gj,m,t = fj,m,t − Afj,jfj,m,t−1 and gi,m,t = ei,m,t − Aei,iei,m,t−1.
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